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Abstract
What is considered to be fair depends on context. Using a modified version of the
Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness
depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation – that is, upon normative
expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries
about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies
accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their
beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how these results fit into a
theory of social norms.

Keywords: game theory, fairness, social norms, normative expectations.
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Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms
Introduction
Social norms are often invoked as explanations of pro-social behavior. Since
norms are ubiquitous in society, it is important to be able to assess under which
conditions individuals will be motivated to follow them, and to distinguish normmotivated behavior from generic social preferences. To accomplish these goals, we need
an operational definition of norms that allows us to make testable predictions about when
norms will be followed, as well as to distinguishing norms from other concepts such as
conventions or personal values. In what follows we adopt a definition of norms that is
grounded upon individuals’ preferences and expectations (Bicchieri, 2006, p.11).
For a social norm to exist and be followed, three conditions must be present.
First, it is necessary that the individuals involved believe it exists and know the class of
situations to which the norm pertains. This condition implies that individuals must be
aware they are in a situation in which a particular norm applies, since lack of awareness
may lead to non-compliance. We thus hypothesize that making a norm salient will lead,
ceteris paribus, to more compliance (Cialdini et al., 1990). The second condition is that
individuals must have a conditional preference for following the norm. Specifically, an
individual will prefer to obey a given norm if she (a) expects other people to comply with
it (empirical expectations) and (b) believes that other people expect her to obey the norm
and may sanction transgressions (normative expectations). The third condition is the
presence of empirical and normative expectations. It follows that an individual may not
obey a norm she knows applies to a given situation if she fails to have the right kind of
expectations.

Transgressions may occur because one observes non-compliance, or
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alternatively normative expectations are absent, or they are present but one can violate
them without being observed.
The conditional preference condition distinguishes social norms from personal
values. In the latter case, one usually has an unconditional preference for following a
certain rule, as expectations about others’ compliance play little or no role in one’s
decision. Having a conditional preference for conformity also implies that one might
follow a norm in the presence of the relevant expectations, but disregard it in their
absence. We thus hypothesize that manipulation of expectations will produce major
shifts in norm-abiding behavior. To test this hypothesis, we focused on a simple version
of the Ultimatum game, in which one of the parties proposes a division of a fixed amount
of money to another party who can then accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected,
both parties get nothing. Experimental results show that participants’ modal and mean
offers are 40 to 50% of the total amount, and offers below 20% are rejected about half of
the time (Camerer, 2003).

These results are generally interpreted as showing that

subjects have a preference for fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).
Our hypothesis instead is that subjects have a conditional preference for following
fairness norms, and manipulation of expectations will lead to significantly different
behavior among the same subjects in different conditions.

These results cannot be

explained by a fairness preference hypothesis, since the material consequences are the
same across conditions, and the only difference between conditions is the level of
information (and thus the expectations) of players. Furthermore, even if we were to
modify the fairness preference hypothesis by making preferences conditional, it would

5
remain to be explained under which conditions preferences would change. The theory of
norms we adopt provides such a testable explanation.
To show that “fair” behavior is dictated by norms that are conditionally followed,
we manipulated both salience and expectations. In the salience treatment, we asked
Proposers which of the options they thought Responders believed to be fair, thus focusing
them on Responders’ normative expectations. Our hypothesis was that making a fairness
norm more salient would induce greater fairness on the part of Proposers. In both the
salience and non-salience conditions, we asked Responders which of the Proposers’
choice options they believed to be fair. The goal of this assessment was twofold. First,
we wanted to check whether there was agreement in Responders’ normative expectations.
Agreement strongly indicates the presence of a shared norm of fairness. Second, we
wanted to assess the agreement of Responders’ normative expectations with Proposers’
beliefs about them. It is significant that Proposers’ answers (in the salience conditions)
agreed with the overall Responders’ answers, a fact that further indicates the presence of
a shared norm.
What counts as fair may vary by context, and in a given context more than one
fairness criterion might apply. Equity and equality considerations may coexist, and
randomization is often perceived as a fair allocation mechanism, as when we use a lottery
to allocate transplant organs.

In our experiment, we added a choice option that

randomized with equal probability between an equal and a very unequal share.
Remarkably, a majority of Responders found this option fair, a finding also reflected in
the Proposers’ beliefs about Responders’ assessments. Adding this option allowed us to
check for norm manipulation (Bicchieri, 2007). That is, when a norm can have several
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interpretations, individuals will tend to adopt the one most favorable to them. This form
of self-serving bias has been studied in the context of equity vs. equality interpretations
of fairness (Frey & Bohnet 1995; Hoffman & Spitzer 1985), and we show that we can
elicit the same bias with a suitable random option, provided this choice option is common
knowledge among participants.
To manipulate expectations, we changed the information conditions in three
versions of the same division problem. We expected a change in normative expectations
to affect Proposers’ choices.

We also predicted the occurrence of norm evasion

(Bicchieri, 2007): whenever it was possible for Proposers to defy normative expectations
without Responders’ knowledge, the proportion of unfair offers would be significantly
higher. Due to the conditional nature of norm compliance, the more ambiguous the
choice situation, the higher will be the proportion of individuals that flaunt the norm,
since their behavior cannot be clearly interpreted as intentional, and thus no sanctioning
is expected to occur.
Our paper is a contribution to a field that may be labeled behavioral ethics. It
should be seen as a subfield of behavioral decision theory, taking into account social and
psychological considerations in an attempt to understand pro-social, “moral” choices. In
this regard, we explore whether and why a pro-social norm will be followed, trying to
gain insights about decision-making and motivation that are useful for further developing
a behavioral account of moral choices.

Method
Participants

7
One hundred and six college-age subjects participated in our study across 11
experimental sessions. Advertisements specified that participants would earn 5 USD in
addition to an amount that would depend on decisions made during the experiment.

Game Paradigm
Our experimental design employed a variant of the Ultimatum Game (Guth et al.,
1982), in which one participant, the Proposer, provisionally received a sum of 10 USD –
provided by the experimenter – and then proposed a division of that money with a
Responder. The Responder subsequently decided to accept or reject the proposal. If the
Responder accepted, both players received the amounts specified in the proposal. If the
Responder rejected, both players received $0. The Proposer chose from one of the
following options:
(5,5) - to propose $5 for the Proposer, and $5 for the Responder;
(8,2) - to propose $8 for the Proposer, and $2 for the Responder; and
Coin - to let the outcome of a fair coin flip determine the proposal: heads
corresponded to (5,5), and tails to (8,2).
Procedure
Upon their arrival, participants randomly drew ID codes labeled A1, A2, , An and
B1, B2, …, Bn, where n is twice the number of participants in the session, and proceeded
either to Room A or B based on their codes. We distributed and read aloud a set of
instructions, which explained the following:
•

Based on random assignment, the participants in Room A were Proposers, and
those in Room B were Responders.
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•

Participants would play three games, † each with a different person in the other
room.

•

By means of a public randomization device, we would select two of the three
games at the end of the study to determine participants’ cash payments.

•

For each game, we would post on the blackboard the Proposer-Responder pairings
using their ID codes, distribute instructions specific to that game, and then
administer a short quiz to test their understanding of the instructions. By posting
pairings publically, we maximized transparency and the likelihood that each
participant would believe he or she actually was interacting with three different
people in the other room.

•

Subsequently, Proposers would be given a proposal form on which they would
write their ID codes and choose one of the available proposals.

•

After all Proposers completed their proposal forms, an assistant would take them
to Room B, where the Responders would mark their decision to accept or reject
the proposal.

Information
The proposal form that was used for each of the three games was determined by
the information condition which we assigned to that game. Appendix B contains the
proposal forms which differed slightly by information condition, as described below.
In the full information condition, the proposal form listed all three options: (5,5),
(8,2), and coin. After Proposers completed their proposal forms, the experimenter in

†

We described the games using the language of Hoffman et al. (1994).

Comment [AKC1]: This addresses
Reviewer 1’s Minor Comment #1.
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Room B flipped a coin in front of the Responders in case any Proposer had marked coin
on her form. On any forms on which the Proposer chose coin, the experimenter then
marked (5,5) or (8,2) based on the coin flip outcome. The instructions explained this, so
that prior to making their decisions, all participants understood that Responders would
know if the Proposers with whom they were paired chose coin.
In the private information condition, the Responder did not know that coin was
available to Proposers, and Proposers knew this fact.
asymmetry, we left coin out of the proposal form.

To create this informational
The experimenter in Room A

explained to Proposers that they could indicate a coin choice by leaving both (5,5) and
(8,2) unmarked; subsequently, the experimenter would flip a coin in Room A, and on any
such forms, mark (5,5) if the outcome was heads, and (8,2) if the outcome was tails.
Thus, Proposers understood that Responders were unaware that coin was an available
option.
In the limited information condition, both Proposers and Responders knew that
coin was available, but also that Responders would not be able to infer whether the
Proposer chose coin or marked one of (5,5) and (8,2) directly.

Specifically, the

instructions explained that Proposers could indicate a coin choice by leaving both (5,5)
and (8,2) unmarked on their proposal forms. The experimenter in Room B would flip a
coin and mark (5,5) or (8,2) accordingly on any such forms. Crucially, he would flip the
coin behind a small screen, so that no participant could see the outcome. Thus, all
participants understood that the Responder would be unable to distinguish forms on
which the Proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2) directly from forms on which the Proposer chose
coin.
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Finally, because Proposers did not receive feedback between conditions, and to
minimize participants' confusion that occurred during a pilot study, we fixed the order of
the information conditions as 1) full, 2) private, and 3) limited.
Salience
In each information condition, prior to making their choices, Responders
completed a questionnaire that measured their normative expectations (see Appendix C).
The questionnaire asked whether the responder found each of the three choice options
fair. The questionnaire was aimed at assessing whether there was an agreement in
Responders’ normative expectations, an indicator of (as well as a necessary condition for)
the existence of a social norm. In addition, roughly half of our experimental sessions
included an incentive-based questionnaire for both Responders and Proposers, which they
completed in each information condition, following the quiz but prior to making their
choices (See Appendices D and E). ‡
These questionnaires asked participants about their beliefs about the percentage of
Responders who indicated (5,5), (8,2) and coin, respectively, as fair options.

The

questionnaires were designed to 1) make fairness norms more salient, and 2) test for an
agreement between Responders’ normative expectations and Proposers’ beliefs about
them. The other half of the sessions included no such questionnaires; they just included
the first Responders’ questionnaire (Appendix C). We distinguish salient sessions which
included these two extra questionnaires from non-salient sessions which did not.

Design and Analyses
‡

For Responders in the salience condition, the second questionnaire in Appendix D was appended to the
one in Appendix C.
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The experiment used a 3 x 2 design, crossing three levels of a within-participant
variable, information (full, private, and limited), with two levels of a between-participant
variable, salience (non-salient and salient). The primary dependent variable was the
Proposer’s choice: (5,5), (8,2), or Coin.
We used a mixed-effects multinomial logit model to estimate choice probabilities.
To determine the significance of information, salience, their interaction, and participantlevel random effects, we used nested model comparisons based on the likelihood ratio
test statistic (LRT). Because small cell sizes made it inadvisable to base inference about
the LRT on the chi-square distribution, we generated p-values for model comparisons
using the non-parametric bootstrap. Bootstrap p-values lead to more accurate inference
when cell counts are sparse. For the same reason, we generated p-values for the logit
coefficients using the bootstrap. Appendix A contains additional details on the bootstrap
methods we employed.

Hypotheses
We first hypothesized that, if there is a social norm, there must be agreement
between Responders’ normative expectations and Proposers’ beliefs about them. We also
hypothesized that choices would depend on information condition and salience. Based on
the theory presented in the Introduction, we made several directional predictions by
considering possible scenarios involving relevant fairness norms.
Firstly, we predicted that the proportion of coin choices would be higher in the
full information condition than in the private or limited conditions. This follows because
in the private information condition, there are no normative expectations for coin (as the

Deleted: To correct p-values for
multiple comparisons, we used Buja &
Rolke’s (2007) method of calibration for
simultaneous inference.
Deleted: statistical methods we
employed
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availability of coin is unknown to Responders), and there should therefore be very few
coin choices, since an outcome of (8,2) is likely to be rejected as unfair. In the limited
condition, Responders could not determine whether the Proposer chose coin. Therefore
the expected utility of coin is a combination of the probability of getting (5,5) or (8,2),
and the probability that (8,2) will be accepted. § If the Proposer assesses a probability
greater than 5/8 that (8,2) will be accepted, she will choose (8,2). If the probability is less
than 5/8, the Proposer will choose (5,5). Only if the probability is exactly 5/8, the
Proposer will be indifferent among the three options. Therefore, Proposers who believed
that less than 62.5% of Responders would accept (8,2) would choose (5,5), since the
expected value of choosing (8,2) would be less than 5. Proposers who believed that more
than 62.5% of Responders would accept (8,2) would choose (8,2), since the expected
value of choosing (8,2) would be more than 5. In either case, there will be few or no coin
choices. Finally, in the full information condition, as long as there were Proposers who
though that choosing coin was perceived to be fair by Responders, the proportion of coin
choices would be positive. This is because these Proposers believe that the expected
utility of choosing coin is 6.5, while the expected utilities of choosing (5,5) or (8,2) are,
respectively, 5 and 0. This is an example of norm manipulation; i.e., participants would
adopt the (allegedly shared) interpretation of fairness that would benefit them the most.
Indeed, coin maximizes expected monetary payoff without violating fairness.
Secondly, we predicted that there would be more (8,2) choices in the limited than
in the full or private information conditions, because some Proposers would take

§

The expected utility of coin is equal to ½(5) + ½ (8)p. p is the probability that the Responder will accept
(8,2) because he believes that the Proposer is ‘playing fair’ and thinks coin is a fair choice. The expected
utility of (5,5) is 5, and the expected utility of (8,2) is 8p. The value of p that makes one indifferent
between the three options is 5/8, or .625.
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advantage of the ambiguity of their choice. Specifically, if some Proposers believed that
a large enough fraction of Responders thought that choosing coin was fair and that
Proposers were playing fair by choosing Coin, then these Proposers could evade the norm
and maximize their monetary expected value by choosing (8,2) in the limited information
condition. **

Thus, the proportion of (8,2) choices should be higher in the limited

information condition than in the full information condition. In the private information
condition, we expected the fraction of (8,2) choices to be low for reasons discussed
below.
Thirdly, we predicted that there would be more (5,5) choices in the private than in
the full or limited information conditions.

Previous work has indicated that the

proportion of (5,5) choices is around 70% when (5,5) and (8,2) are the only available
options (Falk et al., 2000). Because the private information condition is most similar to
this situation, and we expected (5,5) to be almost universally considered fair, we expected
similar proportions of (5,5) choices.

In the full information condition, because we

expected a relatively larger number of coin choices (due to norm manipulation), we
expected fewer (5,5) choices. In the limited information condition, because we expected
a relatively larger number of (8,2) choices (as the ambiguity of choices led to norm
evasion), we expected fewer (5,5) choices.
Finally, because we expected the questionnaire in the salient condition to focus
Proposers on fairness – i.e., on choosing either (5,5) or coin, and not (8,2) – we predicted
that the above effects would be amplified.
Results

**

That is, p must be greater than .625 for a Proposer to choose (8,2) in the limited condition.

Deleted: We summarize our predictions
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Choices by Information and Salience
Figure 1 shows the choice proportions for each level of Information x Salience.
As salience effects appeared to be small, we averaged across salience conditions in
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reporting the choice proportions below. 37.7% (20/53) of Proposers chose coin in the full
information condition, compared to 11.3% (6/53) in the private condition and 5.7%
(3/53) in the limited condition, consistent with our first hypothesis. Consistent with our
second hypothesis, more Proposers chose (8,2) in the limited condition (58.5% [31/53])
than in the full (24.5% [13/53]) or private (37.7% [20/53]) conditions. We observed the
highest frequency of (5,5) choices in the private condition (50.9% [27/53]) relative to the
full (37.7% [20/53]) and limited (35.8% [19/53]) conditions, consistent with our third
hypothesis.
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The primarily additive effect of salience combined with differences in choice
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proportions across information conditions suggests the presence of both main effects, but
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not their interaction. Indeed, nested model comparisons (see Table 1) confirmed that a
model with main effects of information and salience – but not their interaction – fit the
choice data the best. Participant-level random effects were not significant for any of the
Deleted: 2

models in Table 1.
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Table 2 shows the estimates for the model with both main effects of information
and salience. Consistent with a norm-based explanation of choices, when normative
expectations for coin are either absent (in the private condition) or can be defied without
consequence (in the limited condition), the predicted probabilities of (5,5) and (8,2),
respectively, are considerably higher than those of coin. This is indicated by the
significantly positive coefficients. On the other hand, when normative expectations for
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coin are present and choices are transparent (in the full information condition), (5,5) is no
more likely than coin (p = .963), whereas (8,2) is in fact less likely (p = .038). The
substantial discrepancy between some of the maximum likelihood (ML) and bootstrap
estimates of the standard error were due to right-skewed coefficients distributions;
accordingly, we used percentiles of the bootstrap distribution to calculate p-values,
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instead of relying on the asymptotic normality of the coefficients.
Based on the model with both main effects, we performed formal tests of our first
three hypotheses using bootstrapping to generate p-values (see Appendix A). As
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suggested by Figure 1, the probability of coin was significantly higher in the full
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information condition than in the private or limited information conditions (p < .001, for
both the salient and non-salient conditions). (8,2), additionally, was more likely to be
chosen in the limited condition than in the full or private information conditions (p < .02,
for both the salient and non-salient conditions). (5,5), however, was not more likely to be
chosen in the private condition than in the other other two conditions (p = .1 and p = .2
respectively for the salient and non-salient conditions). Thus, we found support for our
first two hypotheses but not for our third.
We found mixed support for our final set of hypotheses, that Proposers would be
more focused on fairness in the salient condition and would therefore be more likely to
choose (5,5) and coin, and less likely to choose (8,2). Respectively in the salient and nonsalient conditions, there were 41 and 25 (5,5) choices (p = .003); 17 and 12 coin choices
(p = .2); and 26 and 38 (8,2) choices (p = .016), where again we generated bootstrapped
p-values using the model with both main effects. Because the interaction between
salience and information was not significant (see Table 1), the norm-focusing effects
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reported above were limited to across information conditions.

Normative Expectations and Beliefs about Them
Table 3 reports the normative expectations of Responders. Clearly, almost all
Responders considered (5,5) to be fair in all information conditions, and a majority of
them also thought that Coin was fair. This may be surprising because the expected utility
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probability of Coin was not significantly
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(padj > .46).¶
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of Coin is only 3.5 USD for the Responder, whereas it is 6.5 USD for the Proposer. A
possible explanation is that using a random device is perceived as a fair way to choose
between alternatives. Responders might have compared Coin to the temptation of (8,2)
and found the Proposer who refused to choose between (5,5) and (8,2) as one making a
fair choice. Alternatively, some might have thought the Proposer, because of her role, had
an entitlement to a greater share, and Coin seemed a fair compromise between five
dollars and eight dollars.
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Figures 2-4 show participants’ beliefs about Responders’ normative expectations
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for each information condition. There is a remarkable degree of agreement between
Responders’ and Proposers’ beliefs about the normative expectations of Responders.
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Moreover, a comparison of Table 3 with Figures 2-4 shows that participants’ beliefs
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about normative expectations are in agreement with the normative expectations
themselves.
Such high degree of agreement is the strongest possible indication that there is a
shared norm of fairness. Not only is (5,5) universally perceived as fair, but also Coin is
thought to be fair by a majority of participants. This agreement explains the tendency to
choose a self-serving interpretation of fairness (norm manipulation) in the full
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information condition, as well as the pattern of choices across information conditions, as
we show in the following section.

Choices as a Function of Beliefs about Normative Expectations
A social norm explanation presupposes consistency between beliefs and behavior.
In particular, it requires consistency between participants’ beliefs about normative
expectations and their subsequent choices. As we show below, the data show a high
degree of consistency between beliefs and behavior.
We denote the Proposers’ belief about the proportion of Responders who consider
(5,5), (8,2), and coin, respectively, as being fair by ϕ (5,5), ϕ (8,2), and ϕ (coin). The
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distributions of these variables are summarized by Figures 2-4. To determine whether
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these beliefs could explain the variance in Proposer’s choices, we fit a multinomial logit
with information condition and the three questionnaire variables as predictors, based on a
stepwise search. †† The signs of the coefficients for the questionnaire variables were in
Deleted: 5

the appropriate directions (see Table 4). As the Proposer’s belief that the Responder
considered (5,5) to be fair increased, (8,2) became less likely relative to the reference
choice of coin (p = .068). As ϕ (coin) increased, the odds of choosing coin over (5,5)
increased as well (p = .048). For higher levels of ϕ (8,2), coin was less likely than (8,2)
(p = .068).
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Figures 5a-b show the predicted probabilities of (8,2) choices by condition as
††

We used a stepwise search that minimized Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), a function of the
likelihood which penalizes larger models (AIC = -2(log-likelihood) + 2k, where k is the number of
parameters in the model that are being estimated). The scope of the model search were information,
ϕ (5,5), ϕ (8,2), and ϕ (coin). When we expanded the scope to search amongst all two-way interactions
as well, AIC selected a model which included ϕ (8,2) x ϕ (coin) in addition to the variables in Table 4
(AIC=158.61). However, we chose to present the simpler model without this interaction term, as it did not
change our substantive results, and Figures 6-7 looked the same with or without it.
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functions of ϕ (8,2) and ϕ (Coin), respectively. In the private information condition, for
example, a Proposer who believes that no Responders find (8,2) to be fair (i.e., ϕ (8,2) =
Deleted: 6a

0) has a predicted probability of .23 of choosing (8,2) -- see Figure 5a. ‡‡ However, a
Proposer who believes that roughly 60% of Responders find (8,2) to be fair is more than
twice as likely to choose (8,2), with a predicted probability of .55.
The strong dependency of (8,2) choices on the Proposer’s belief that Coin is
Deleted: 6b

considered to be fair in the limited information condition (see Figure 5b) is also
noteworthy. A Proposer who believes that no Responders find Coin to be fair has a
predicted probability of only .10 of choosing (8,2). However, a Proposer who believes
that all Responders find Coin to be fair has a predicted probability of .53 of choosing
Coin, a five-fold increase. This occurs because the Proposer can choose (8,2) with
impunity when the Proposer’s estimate of the probability that Coin is considered fair by
Responders is high. If the Proposer believes that a) the Responder thinks Coin is fair and
b) the Responder believes that the Proposer is playing fair by choosing Coin, then (8,2) is
expected to be accepted with high probability because it will be interpreted as the
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unlucky outcome of a coin flip. Moreover, as Figure 5b shows, the predicted probability
of (8,2) choices in the limited information condition increases with the Proposer’s
estimate of the probability that Coin is considered fair by Responders. Whereas the
existence of more than one interpretation of fairness leads to norm manipulation (i.e., the
Proposer chooses Coin instead of (5,5) in the full information condition), the presence of
ambiguity leads to norm evasion (i.e., the Proposer chooses (8,2) in the limited
information condition because the source of the offer is not identifiable as being

‡‡

The other belief variables are held fixed at their median values for these predictions.
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intentional or due to chance). Indeed, 76% of Proposers choose (8,2) in the limited
information condition. And even when Proposers are focused on fairness in the salience
condition, the proportion of (8,2) choices is relatively high.
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Finally, Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of Coin choices as a function of

ϕ (Coin) by condition. Clearly, the probability of choosing Coin increases with the
Proposer’s estimate of the proportion of Responders who consider Coin to be fair. As
mentioned earlier, the Proposer’s self-serving bias would lead to a greater frequency of
Coin choices whenever it is clear that Responders know that Coin has been chosen and
Deleted: Table 1

that they consider Coin to be fair. This can also be seen in Figure 1, where the proportion
of Coin choices in the full information condition is substantially larger relative to the
other information conditions.

Responder Behavior
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Table 5 shows that Responders discriminated between intentional offers and offers that
were generated by a chance mechanism. In the full information condition, no (8,2) offers
resulting from a Coin choice were rejected, whereas intentional (8,2) offers were rejected
23% of the time. Responders’ rejection rates of (8,2) were also sensitive to the presence
of an intermediate choice. In the private information condition, in which Responders
believe the only choices are (5,5) and (8,2), the rejection rate is much higher than in the
full information condition (40% vs. 23%), in which Responders know that the Coin
choice is available. When there is ambiguity as to the source of the choice, as in the
limited information condition, the rejection rate of (8,2) was low (16.1%). This suggests
that the large majority of Responders who receive an (8,2) offer in the limited
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information condition believe both that it is the result of a Coin choice and that choosing
Coin is fair. The large number of Proposers who choose (8,2) in the limited information
condition seem to expect this low rate of rejections.

Conclusions
Having a well-defined, testable theory of social norms allows us to explain what
would prima facie appear to be inconsistencies in individual behavior. Individuals choose
to be fair on occasion, but revert to selfish behavior on others. The theory of social norms
we adopt explains away these apparent inconsistencies. Compliance with a norm is
conditional upon having the right kind of empirical and normative expectations. It is also
important that individuals focus on the relevant norm in order for them to comply with it.
The theory of we adopt (Bicchieri, 2006) predicts that making a norm salient will tend to
increase compliance and, even more important, that the presence of the appropriate
expectations is crucial for attaining conformity to the norm. We thus expected that
manipulating expectations by changing the information available to individuals would
result in large shifts in behavior.
The data we presented highlight two important phenomena connected to norm
compliance. The first is norm manipulation (Bicchieri, 2007): when a norm can have
several interpretations, individuals will tend to choose the interpretation that best serves
their interests. This effect is evident in the choice of Coin in the full information
condition. In this condition, the participants have common knowledge of the Proposer’s
access to the three choices of (5,5), (8,2), and Coin, as well as the Responder’s ability to
differentiate between an intentional unfair offer and an unfair offer resulting from a
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chance event. In the full information condition, the proportion of coin choices is the same
as the proportion of (5,5) choices. Moreover, this manipulation of the fairness norm is
made possible by the implicit and strong agreement among the Responder’s normative
expectations about the fairness of Coin choices and both Proposers’ and Responders’
agreement about such normative expectations. As we mentioned at the outset, such an
agreement is a strong indication of the presence of a shared norm.
The second phenomenon is norm evasion. Norm evasion differs from norm
avoidance, in which an individual avoids a specific situation to which a norm applies. A
vivid example of norm avoidance is the behavior of the Iks described by Turnbull (1972).
The Iks repaired their huts in the middle of the night so as to avoid their neighbors’ offers
of help, as such offers had to be accepted, and that involved incurring an obligation that
the beneficiary wanted to avoid. Norm evasion, on the contrary, is the deliberate, private
flouting of a norm even if one knows the normative expectations of the relevant parties.
For many individuals, the presence of normative expectations without the sanctioning
element weakens the grip of the norm. Such expectations can be violated at no cost, as
the victim will not be able to distinguish an intentional action from a chance event. Norm
evasion explains Proposers’ behavior in the limited information condition, in which (8,2)
was the most frequent choice.
Our work introduces the field of behavioral ethics and builds on the seminal work
of Guth et al. (1982) and Hoffman et al. (1994), who showed the importance of context in
games requiring the division of resources. We add to that work by showing that the
effect of context is mediated by the role that normative expectations and shared norms
hold in explaining behavior. Secondly, our measurement of first-order (Responders’
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fairness judgments) and second-order (Proposers’ and Responders’ beliefs about
Responders’ fairness judgments) beliefs is a highly useful but underused method in
experiments on strategic interactions.

Thirdly, our results potentially allow us to

distinguish between different types of individuals. Future work will explore how a more
fine-grained account of individuals’ sensitivity to specific norms explains their choices,
and whether there are correlations between sensitivities to different norms, such as those
of cooperation, fairness, and reciprocity. Strong correlations would indicate the existence
of a general disposition to follow social norms, whereas a low correlation would indicate
that norm compliance is a local, norm-specific phenomenon.
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Appendix A: Statistical Methods
Rationale for Statistical Methods
To evaluate our hypotheses and predictions, traditional approaches using the
general linear model or the chi-square test for independence are inadequate for at least
two reasons. Firstly, our data contain multiple responses from each participant. If these
responses were substantially correlated, the standard error estimates produced by
traditional methods would be too small. Secondly, four of the eighteen cells (3 choices x
3 information conditions x 2 salience treatments) in our data had counts of less than five,
making inference based on asymptotic results unadvisable.
The Bootstrap
Asymptotically, logit coefficients and the LRT follow known distributions (under
general regularity conditions). However, this is not true for small samples. The bootstrap
distribution of a statistic can be used to check the validity of basing inference on
asymptotic results. Roughly half of the coefficients in the multinomial logit models we
estimated had right-skew (and hence, non-normal) bootstrap distributions, and the
majority of the bootstrap distributions of the LRTs were not chi-square. Had we relied on
traditional analyses based on the normal and chi-square distributions, our standard error
estimates and p-values would have been too small. We provide details of our bootstrap
methods below.
Let yobs = (y1, y2, …, yn) denote the vector of observed data, let T(yobs) denote the
statistic of interest, and let F denote the underlying distribution that generated the data.
The bootstrap estimates F using yobs, thereby producing an estimate, F^, of the
distribution of T(yobs). The non-parametric bootstrap estimates F^ as the distribution
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generated by random sampling with replacement from the set of observed data points,
{y1, y2, …, yn}. The parametric bootstrap estimates F^ by estimating the model’s free
parameters and then sampling from the assumed distribution conditional on its
parameters being fixed at their estimated values. Using either nonparametric or
parametric bootstrap, one generates a bootstrap data set, y, by taking n draws from F^.
The quantity T(y) is the bootstrap estimate of T(yobs), and the distribution of T(y) is its
bootstrap distribution. Letting y1, y2, …, yn be n bootstrap data sets, the standard error
estimate of T(yobs,) is the standard deviation of T(y1), T(y2), …, T(yn).
We produced each parametric bootstrap estimate based on the multinomial logit
model by 1) fitting the multinomial logit model using maximum likelihood, 2) generating
159 draws from the multinomial distribution with its parameters fixed at their maximum
likelihood estimates from step 1, and 3) computing and recording the bootstrap estimates
of the statistic of interest. We then repeated the above steps 9,999 times to determine the
distribution of the statistic. The procedure for generating non-parametric bootstrap
estimates is similar: 1) randomly select 25 Proposers in the control and 28 Proposers in
the salient condition, with replacement, 2) compute the statistic of interest, and 3) repeat
the previous two steps 9,999 times.
To determine the p-value for each multinomial logit coefficient, we computed the
smallest value of alpha for which zero was not contained in the confidence interval
formed by the ( n * α / 2 )th and ( n * (1 − α / 2) )th quantiles (sorted values) of the
parametric bootstrap estimates of the coefficients, T(y1), T(y2), …, T(yn). §§ The estimate
of the p-value is the proportion of bootstrap estimates that fell strictly outside this

§§

The decimal precision of this value is determined by the number of bootstrap replicates.
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interval, which estimates the probability of drawing a coefficient more extreme in either
tail of its distribution than the observed value.

Although the distribution of the

coefficient divided by its estimated standard error converges in probability to the standard
normal, this is not necessary true for small samples. Thus, computing a p-value based on
quantiles of the bootstrap distribution is preferable. We determined the p-value for the
LRT in the same way, except that we constructed a one-sided confidence interval by
omitting the division of α by two, as we expected LRTs to be positive under the null
hypothesis.
We also used the boostrap to generate p-values for our hypothesis tests. For our
first three hypotheses, we formed our test statistics by taking the predicted probability for
the choice and information condition of interest, and subtracting from it the maximum of
the predicted probabilities for the two other information conditions. For example, for the
first hypothesis, that coin choices would be more likely in the full information condition
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test statistic for (1) is

positive, the p-value was the proportion of bootstrap replicates that were negative. Test
statistics for the last three hypotheses were formed analogously.
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Appendix B: Proposal Forms

Proposal form for the first game (full information condition)
(1) Identification number (Proposer fills this out): ___________
(2) Paired with (Proposer fills this out): ___________
(3) Proposer’s choices (Proposer check one):
___

$5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder

___

$8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder

___

Let a coin flip decide which of the above choices will be made.

(4) Responder’s decision (Responder check one):
___ Accept

___ Reject

Proposal form for second game (private information condition)
(1) Identification number (Proposer fills this out): ___________
(2) Paired with (Proposer fills this out): ___________
(3) Proposer’s choices (Proposer check one):
___

$5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder

___

$8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder

(4) Responder’s decision (Responder check one):
___ Accept

___ Reject

Proposal form for third game (limited information condition)
(1) Identification number (Proposer fills this out): ___________
(2) Paired with (Proposer fills this out): ___________
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(3) Proposer’s choices (Proposer check one):
___

$5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder

___

$8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder
Let a coin flip decide which of the above choices will be made.

(4) Responder’s decision (Responder check one):
___ Accept

___ Reject
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Appendix C: Questionnaire 1 for Responders
Item (3) of each block of questions was omitted for the private condition, because
Responders did not know that the Coin option was available to Proposers.
Questionnaire
Your identification number: _____________
Please guess how many Proposers will choose:
(1)

$5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder: _________

(2)

$8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder: _________

(3)

Let a coin flip decide:

_________

If your guess is correct, you will earn a $1 bonus.

Please mark any options you believe are fair options. You are free to choose none of the
options, one, or more than one option. Your answer will not affect your payment.
(1)

$5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder

[ ]

(2)

$8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder

[ ]

(3)

Let a coin flip decide

[ ]
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Appendix D: Questionnaire 2 for Responders
Please guess how many Responders (excluding you) will select each of the options in the
above question as fair options. For each line on which your guess is correct, you will
earn a $1 bonus.
(1)

$5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder _________

(2)

$8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder _________

(3)

Let a coin flip decide

_________
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Appendix E: Questionnaire for Proposers
The questionnaire item regarding the Coin option was omitted in the private condition, as
Proposers understood that Responders thought the Coin option was unavailable in that
condition.
Questionnaire
Your identification number: _____________
Each Responder was asked to decide whether the ‘$5 and $5’ option is fair.
Please guess how many Responders selected this option as fair: ________
Each Responder was asked to decide whether the ‘$8 and $2’ option is fair.
Please guess how many Responders selected this option as fair:_________
Each Responder was asked to decide whether the coin flip option is fair.
Please guess how many Responders selected this option as fair:_________
Note that Responders may answer no to all questions or yes to one or more questions.
For each line on which your guess is correct, you will earn a $1 bonus.
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Table 1. Model comparisons for information and salience. P-values are based on
bootstrap quantiles (see Appendix A for details), and not the chi-square distribution. ***
Null

Alternative

df

LRT

p

-

Null (N)

-

-

-
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Table 2. Multinomial logit model of information and salience as predictors of choices.
Maximum likelihood (ML) and bootstrap standard error estimates are included. P-values
are based on bootstrap quantiles (see Appendix A for details). The reference level for
choice is Coin, for information is the full condition, and for salience is the salient
condition. †††
Log-odds

ML SE

Bootstrap SE

p

Intercept

0.02

0.37

0.39

.963

Limited

1.84

0.69

1.72

.0007

Private

1.50

0.55

0.72

.0009

Non-Salient

-0.07

0.48

0.48

.913

Intercept

-0.89

0.45

0.47

.0380

Limited

2.83

0.71

1.73

.0001

Private

1.66

0.59

0.76

.0011

Non-Salient

0.86

0.50

0.53

.0777

(5,5)

(8,2)

†††

Thus, for example, the predicted probability of choosing (5,5) in the limited condition
and salient treatment is exp(.02+1.84)/(exp(0) + exp(.02+1.84) + exp(-.89+2.83)) = .45.
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Table 3. Normative expectations of Responders. Each cell contains the proportion
(fraction) of Responders who indicated that the choice was fair.
Choice
Condition

5,5

8,2

Coin

Full

96.4%

27/28

14.3%

4/28

Private

96.4%

27/28

17.9%

5/28

Limited

96.4%

27/28

14.3%

4/28

64.3%

18/28

57.1%

16/28
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Table 4. Multinomial logit model of information and beliefs about Responders’
normative expectations as predictors of choices. The model was selected via a stepwise
search (AIC = 166.83).
Log-odds

p

Intercept

-13.34

.144

Limited

0.86

.318

Private

-0.03

.958

ϕ (5,5)

14.99

.131

ϕ (coin)

-2.33

.048

ϕ (8,2)

0.89

.587

Intercept

4.95

.176

limited

2.64

.002

private

2.87

.05

ϕ (5,5)

-7.21

.068

ϕ (coin)

0.55

.663

ϕ (8,2)

3.11

.068

(5,5)

(8,2)
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Table 5. Rejection rates and frequencies by offer source, offer, and condition.
Offer
Offer:

(5,5)

(8,2)

Direct

0.0% 0/20

23.1% 3/13

Coin

0.0% 0/16

0.0% 0/4

Private

0.0% 0/28

40.0% 10/25

Limited

0.0% 0/20

18.2% 6/33

Full
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Figure 1. Choice proportions of (5,5), (8,2), and coin in each level of Information x
Salience. Error bars are bootstrap estimates of one standard error of the choice
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proportion.
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Coin, respectively. Proposers’ mean beliefs were 96.6%, 14.9%, 65.0%.
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Figure 3. Boxplots of beliefs about normative expectations in the private information
condition. Responders’ mean beliefs were 98.1% and 16.0%, for (5,5) and (8,2),
respectively. Proposers’ mean beliefs were 99.1% and 12.5%.
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Figure 4. Boxplots of beliefs about normative expectations in the limited information
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condition. Responders’ mean beliefs were 96.0%, 10.0%, and 54.4%, for (5,5), (8,2), and
Coin, respectively. Proposers’ mean beliefs were 98.8%, 17.6%, 49.3%.
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Figure 5. Predicted probability of (8,2) as a function of the Proposer’s estimate of the
proportion of Responders who considered a) (8,2) fair, and b) Coin fair, by condition. For
each graph, the other beliefs are held fixed at their median values.
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Figure 6. Predicted probability of Coin as a function of the Proposer’s belief about
Responders’ normative expectations by condition. The other beliefs are held fixed at their
median values.
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We summarize our predictions below. Let π {x,

7/24/2008 7:28:00 PM
y, z}

denote the proportion of

choice x in information condition y and salience treatment z.

Hypotheses (1) – (6). Choice proportions follow a social norm in which (5,5) and coin are
viewed as fair, but (8,2) is not, for both the control and salient conditions:

π {coin, full, control} > max( π {coin, private, control}, π {coin, limited, control})

(1)

π {coin, full, salient} > max( π {coin, private, salient}, π {coin, limited, salient})

(2)

π {(5,5), private, control} > max( π {(5,5), full, control}, π {(5,5), limited, control})

(3)

π {(5,5), private, salient} > max( π {(5,5), full, salient}, π {(5,5), limited, salient})

(4)

π {(8,2), limited, control} > max( π {(8,2), private, control}, π {(8,2), full, control})

(5)

π {(8,2), limited, salient} > max( π {(8,2), private, salient}, π {(8,2), full, salient})

(6)

Hypotheses (7) – (9). Choice proportions reflect normative focus in salient vs. control
sessions:

π {coin, full, salient} > π {coin, full, control}

(7)

π {(8,2), limited, control} > π {(8,2), limited, salient}

(8)

π {(5,5), private, salient} > π {(5,5), private, control}

(9)

Page 34: [2] Deleted

Alex Chavez

7/31/2008 7:04:00 AM

Table 1. Choices by Information x Salience. Percentages and fractions correspond to each
row in the table. S stands for the salient condition, N for non-salient condition, and T for
the total.

Choice
5,5

Full

Private

Limited

8,2

Coin

S 42.9%

12/28

17.9%

5/28

39.3%

11/28

N 32.0%

8/25

32.0%

8/25

36.0%

9/25

T 37.7%

20/53

24.5%

13/53

37.7%

20/53

S 57.1%

16/28

32.1%

9/28

10.7%

3/28

N 44.0%

11/25

44.0%

11/25

12.0%

3/25

T 50.9%

27/53

37.7%

20/53

11.3%

6/53

S 46.4%

13/28

42.9%

12/28

10.7%

3/28

N 24.0%

6/25

76.0%

19/25

0.0%

0

T 35.8%

19/53

58.5%

31/53

5.7%

3/53
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